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1.Introduction  
 
Bates(2009) state that the average cash to assets ratio for U.S. industrial firms more 
than doubles from 1980 to 2006. They investigate U.S firms from 1980 to 2006 find 
that the average cash- to- assets ratio has increased by 0.46% per year. In the last 
twenty years, lots of studies and researches have been conducted to find what makes 
firms hold more cash than they used to be. For example, Ozkan and Ozekan (2003) 
investigate the empirical determinants of corporate cash holdings for a sample of UK 
firms, which focus on managerial ownership among other corporate governance 
characteristics. Kusnadi(2003) investigates publicly listed companies in Singapore, 
which concentrated on analyzing corporate governance and corporate cash holdings 
by using firm-specific data from Singapore. Saddour (2006) investigate French firms 
from 1998 to 2002, find that growth companies hold higher levels of cash than 
mature companies. They also find that both trade-off and pecking order theories play 
an important role in explaining the determinants of cash holdings of growth and 
mature French firms.  
 
First, the transaction motive suggests that companies hold cash to avoid the 
transaction costs of selling assets and raising funds from external finance. The 
precautionary motive states that companies hold cash as buffer against possible 
adverse shocks in the future, or get benefit from good investment opportunities in 
the futures. The tax motives for companies to hold cash is that the tax incentive that 
multinational firms face. The agency motive suggests that the existence of 
asymmetric information and conflicting interests between investors and managers 
result in companies to hold cash. Lastly, based on the pecking order theory, 
companies prefer to use internal finance than external finance.  
 
The literature generally uses three main theories to explain cash holdings which are 
trade- off theory, pecking order theory and agency theory. The trade-off theory 
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which suggests that the optimal amount of cash that company hold is a trade-off 
between the benefits and costs of cash; the pecking order theory claims that there is 
a financing hierarchy exists in company, which means companies prefer to use 
internal finance over external finance. Moreover, companies prefer choose debt over 
equity when using external financing. The agency theory describes the in a 
managerial entrenchment company, entrenched managers choose to hold more cash 
rather than pay it out to shareholders when lack of investment opportunities.  
 
In the first part of this paper, it is going to review the theoretical background of 
underlying cash holdings theories, motives and determinants. The second part is 
going to construct seven variables and hypothesis based on the theories and motive 
discussed in part one. Third, due to most of the past studies and research are based 
on U.S. capital market however this paper is going to focus on UK public companies. 
Therefore, I will talk about difference of corporate governance between U.S. and U.K. 
from three aspects, institutional investors, board structure and role of regulation. 
The following section is about data description, regression and results. From 
summarize the data; it can be found that the cash ratio in UK during the last two 
decades increased as well. And the companies without dividend cash ratio increased 
much more than those companies with dividend which is consistent with Bates et 
al(2009) ?s conclusion. In regression analysis, I followed the model Bates et al(2009) 
and Daher(2010) used in their studies. I got some similar results with past studies, as 
well as some differences. I find that the firm size, capital expenditure, net working 
capital, leverage ratio are negatively related to cash ratio and cash flow is positively 
related to cash ratio. This result is in line with past studies. However, I find sales 
growth rate is irrelevant with cash ratio which is not consistent with Opler et al. and 
Harris (1999) which argue there is a positive relationship between investment 
opportunity and cash ratio. Moreover, when considering agency problem, I use 
Herfindahl Index to proxy of ownership concentration and I find there is no 
relationship between ownership concentration and cash ratio which is not 
accordance with Bates et al(2009) but this may caused by smaller sample size as 
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difficult to get data.  
2. Theoretical and Empirical Literature Review 
2.1 The motives 
 
In a perfect capital market, the amount of a firm ?s cash holdings does not affect the 
wealth of its shareholders. Cash holdings are irrelevant as companies can raise fund 
at zero cost if they do not have enough cash. However, there are some costs such as 
transaction costs, taxes, financial distress costs, asymmetric information and agency 
costs associate with external finance in real market. As a consequences, cash 
holdings influence shareholders wealth (Soenen,2003). 
 
The literatures have provided four motives for companies to hold cash. This section is 
going to talk about four motives which are mentioned in literatures. The four motives 
are transaction motive, precautionary motive, tax motive and agency motive.   
The Transaction Motive.  
The earliest explanations supplied by academic study were based on trade-offs 
motivated by transactions costs. These theories imply that companies hold cash 
when they incur transaction costs associated with changing a noncash financial asset 
into cash and uses cash for payment. In other words, companies facing a shortage of 
internal resources can raise funds, by selling assets, issuing new debt or equity or 
reducing dividends. However, all these methods will incur transaction cost 
(Baumol,1952).  
 
The Precautionary Motive. 
Company needs cash to secure future cash needs because of the unpredictability of 
future cash flow. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) pointed out that 
7 
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companies will hold more cash if they have riskier cash flows and poor access to 
capital market.  
 The Tax Motive. 
Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite(2007) find that US companies with repatriating 
foreign earnings hold more cash due to repatriating foreign earnings generate tax 
consequences. Foley, Hartzell, Titman and Twite(2007) mentioned in their paper that 
the US taxes the foreign operations of domestic companies and grants tax credits for 
foreign income taxes paid abroad. For most US Affiliates, these taxes are equal to the 
difference between foreign income taxes paid and tax payments that would be due if 
foreign earnings were taxed at the US rate, and they can be deferred until earnings 
are repatriated. These tax burdens make foreign operations of domestic firms more 
willing to hold the retained earnings aboard unless they have attractive investment 
opportunities. Therefore, companies which operated aboard and have repatriating 
foreign profits hold higher levels of cash. 
The Agency Motive 
Jensen(1986) find that entrenched managers would prefer to keep cash than pay 
dividend to shareholders when the company has poor investment opportunity. 
Entrenched managers are like to build excess cash balance to realize their own 
benefit rather than maximize shareholders wealth.  
 
2.2 Cash holding theories  
 
Since Keynes(1936) published those motives for company cash holdings, some more 
advanced models have been developed. In the next section the affecting factors for 
cash holdings according to three different models to explain why companies hold 
cash.  
8 
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The Static Trade-off Theory 
According to the static trade-off model of firm cash holdings, the amount of cash 
held by a company is determined by weighting the marginal costs and the marginal 
benefits of holding liquid assets (Ferreira and Vilela, 2003).  
 
There are several benefits of holding liquid assets. First, the benefit of holding cash is 
that cash decreases the exposure to financial distress, if there are unexpected losses, 
cash would act as a buffer. Moreover, holding cash can reduce the transaction costs 
associate with the external funds or liquidating assets. Third, cash enable a firm to 
take the optimal investment policy and hence makes a firm to accept positive NPV 
projects if external financing constrains are met.  
 
On the other hand, there is one cost of holding liquid assets. Ferreira and Vilela(2004) 
state that the main cost of holding cash is the opportunity cost of the capital invested 
in liquid assets.  Holding cash rather than investing in other project will result in 
lower return earned on it.  
 
Opler et al., 1999; Ross et al.(2000) state that there is a optimal amount of cash 
holding exists since selling financial and real assets produces costs. Transaction costs 
generally include fixed costs and variable costs, depending proportionally on the 
amount of cash raised. As a result, each company has a optimal amount of liquid 
assets and cash cannot be regarded as negative debt. 
 
The optimal amount of cash for a company is determined by the marginal cost of a 
liquid asset shortage and the marginal cost of holding liquid assets. The marginal cost 
of cash holding is fix as there is no evidence show that the lower return of cash 
compared to other investments changes as the amount of cash hold 
changes(Anonym,2010). The more liquid assets a company have, the less frequently 
it requires to access to capital market.  
9 
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An increase in the probability of being sell of liquid assets or an increase in the of 
being short of liquid assets would shift the cost curve to the right, lead to a higher 
optimal amount of cash holdings(Opler et al.,1999). 
 
Due to the assumptions of static trade-off theory, there are some financial and 
non-financial variables that influence the optimal amount of liquid assets(Dittmar et 
al.,2003; Ferreira and Vilela,2002; Opler et al., 1999).  
 
The trade-off theory suggest that company with better investment opportunities are 
expected to have more cash as the opportunity costs would be higher if they 
abandon NPV-positive projects because difficult raising fund. In other words, when a 
company has large amounts of liquid assets, it can take projects, even if the 
shareholders or debtors are not willing to supply fund to these projects.  
 
Larger company normally easier to access to capital markets than smaller companies. 
Because the fixed cost associate with raising external funds is relatively more 
expensive for small company than larger company. 
 
Companies holding liquid asset substitutes are expected to hold less cash than other 
companies. This is because cash and liquid assets are substitutions; it indicates that 
companies with a high level of liquid assets are not necessary hold large amount of 
cash. 
 
Ferreira and Vilela(2002) state that there is no clear relationship between 
leverage ,the amount of liquid assets of a company and firm cash hold in the 
trade-off model. They state that as the leverage increases the risk of a company to 
suffer from financial distress in the future, therefore, companies with high level of 
leverage are expected to hold more liquid assets in order to reduce bankruptcy risk. 
However, on the other hand, leverage can also be regarded as proxy for a compĂŶǇ ?Ɛ
10 
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ability to raise debt. Companies that easy get debt from outside investors are usually 
large companies with good reputation. Therefore, as they are easier to access to 
capital market, they are expected to hold less cash. However, Anonyn(2010) argue 
ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ ŵŝƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ůĞǀĞƌĂŐĞ ŽŶůǇ ƐƚĂŶĚƐ ĨŽƌ Ă ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ĨŽƌŵĞƌ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ
access capital markets rather than the ability to raise cash in the future. Moreover, 
companies with high level of debt will be more difficult accessing to capital market as 
the high leverage will make external financing more expensive. And the amount of 
money should be influenced by the future ability to raise money not now. Hence, 
generally there is no clear prediction for explaining cash holdings in the trade-off 
model. 
 
The Trade-off theory suggest that company pay dividend are expected to have lower 
cash level as they can reduce these payment to get additional funds. In contrast, 
companies not paying dividend have to access the capital market.  
 
 
The trade-off model suggests that the greater the company cash flow volatility, the 
company may short more liquid assets. However, it may be costly for company to 
short liquid asset so that company may pass up valuable investment opportunities. 
Therefore companies with higher cash flow volatile are expected to hold more cash 
in an attempt to reduce the expected costs of liquidity constraints( Ozkan and 
Ozkan,1996). Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach(2004) find that financially 
constrained firms have higher cash flow sensitivity of cash. In other words, financially 
constrained firms hold much more cash when cash flow is high. Han and Qiu (2007) 
find that from 1998 to 2002, the cash holdings of constrained firms increase with 
cash flow volatility.  
 
The R&D projects always related to high information asymmetries, however manages 
ŵŽƌĞ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂďůĞ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂŶ
current or potential investors. Therefore companies have more R&D expenses should 
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hold more cash. This is due to companies with high R&D expenses are more financial 
distress costs are large for R&D projects(Opler et al.,1999).   
 
Pecking order theory 
All previously described motives for companies to hold cash is based on the 
assumption that companies optimize shareholders wealth by comparing the benefits 
and costs of leverage and cash holdings (Grinblatt and Titman,2004). The pecking 
order theory suggests that there is no optimal amount of leverage level and cash, but 
capital structures are determined in a dynamic way (Mangnus,2011). There are two 
main ideas of the pecking order theory. One is that companies prefer to use internal 
finance for investment than external finance. The other one is companies prefer to 
choose debt finance over equity financing when use external financing. 
 
Due to the companies ? management has more knowledge than outsider 
shareholders result in external finance costly(Myers,1984). Thus the companies may 
not be able to sell the shares for their true value. As a result, the company may 
choose to pass up a valuable investment opportunity to prevent issuing underpriced 
shares. The company can eliminate these costs caused by information asymmetry by 
retaining enough internally generated cash to fund this future investment 
opportunities. 
 
Moreover, If the company needs external financing, the pecking order theory 
suggests that the safest shares should be issued before more risky shares are used 
(Mangnus,2011). Safe shares are the share value does not change much when the 
company ?s provided inside information to public. So according to the pecking order 
theory a company a company issues the straight debt first which is the safest share. 
Convertible bonds are the next to be used, and the last option is issues equity. If the 
company has enough funds to invest all positive net present value projects, it often 
pays off its debt and accumulates liquid assets (Mangnus,2011). 
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Agency cost theory  
The agency problem was first explored in Ross(1973), he described that the 
managers as the  ‘agentƐ ? and the shareholderƐĂƐ ‘ principal ? , the problem that arises 
as a result of this system of corporate ownership is that the agents do not necessarily 
make decisions in the best interests of the principal. It is likely that company 
managers prefer to pursue their own personal objectives, such as aiming to gain the 
highest bonuses possible. According to the managerial capitalism theory(Martin et 
al,1998) managers avoid using external finance because doing so would subject them 
to the discipline of the marketplace. Due to managers are responses for company ?s 
routine business, managers being far more knowledgeable about the company  ?s 
activities and financial situation than current or potential investors. According to 
agency theory cost theory, the expenses paid for managers to monitoring the 
companies which is called agency costs.  
 
Due to the conflicts between managers and shareholders are the separation of 
ownership and control. Consequently, some literature suggests that managerial 
ownership can help align the interests of managers with those of shareholders y 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980b; Leftwich et al., 1981). Managerial 
ŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉŝƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚďǇŚŽƵ ? ? ? ? ? )ĂƐ “ƚŚĞĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƐŚĂƌĞƐŚĞůĚďǇƚŚĞ
CEO, including restricted shares but excluding stock options, expressed as the 
ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ Ĩŝƌŵ ?Ɛ ƚŽƚĂů ƐŚĂƌĞƐ ŽƵƚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ? ?  dŚŝƐ ŵĞĂŶƐ ? ǁŝƚŚ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ
managerial ownership, managers are less likely to invest poor projects and will try to 
maximize the companies wealth as managerial ownership align their own interest 
ǁŝƚŚĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ?ŽƚŚĞƌ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ?ƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ ? ŝƚĂůůŽǁƐƚŚĞĨŝƌŵŚĂƐĂ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ůŽǁĞƌ
ĂŐĞŶĐǇ ĐŽƐƚ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ ƚŚĞ Ĩŝƌŵ ?Ɛ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ƌĂŝƐĞ ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ĨŝŶĂŶĐĞ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁŽƵůĚ
ƌĞĚƵĐĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐŵŽƚŝǀĞƚŽŚŽůĚĐĂƐŚ ?       
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However, Morck et al(1998) argue that high share ownership by managers would 
lead to outside shareholders difficult to control the decisions of managers. 
Consequently, managers who are less control by external discipline would prefer hold 
more cash to pursue their own benefits without replacement (Ozkan and 
Ozkan,1996). Opler, et al(1999) show that management may hold cash to realize its 
own objectives at shareholder expense. For example, managers may hold excess 
amount of cash just as they do not want to take risk. Furthermore, management hold 
excess cash may due to they does not want to pay dividend. Jensen (1986) states that 
entrenched managers would maintain cash instead of paying out to shareholders 
when companies lack of good investment opportunities. 
 
Ozkan and Ozkan(2004) find that a non-monotonic relation where cash holdings fall 
as managerial ownership increase up to 24%, increase as managerial ownership 
increases to 64%, then fall again at higher levels of managerial ownership. 
Composition and the existence of ultimate controllers do not affect the relationship. 
 
Furthermore, Ozkan and Ozkan(2004) argue that the company board of director 
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ǁŝůů ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ĐĂƐŚ ŚŽůĚŝŶŐƐ ? dŚĞ ĂĚďƵƌǇ ZĞƉŽƌƚ
recommended that company boards should meet frequently and should monitor 
executive management. The Higgs Report (2003) in the UK state that the presence of 
independent non-executive directors on company boards, should help to reduce the 
notorious conflicts of interest between shareholders and company management 
(Solomon,2007). The non-executive directors are chosen to stand for the 
ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?interests ( Rosenstein and Wyatt,1997;Mayers et al.,1997). Accordingly, 
boards with greater outside director representation will make better decision than 
boards mainly depend on inside-executive directors.(Ozkan and 
Ozkan(2004))Considered that non-executive directors act a significant monitoring 
and disciplining function over executive directors, therefore it should expect that 
companies with outside- dominated boards are likely to experience lower agency 
costs of raising external finance and hold lower level of cash.  
14 
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KǌŬĂŶĂŶĚKǌŬĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? )ĂůƐŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚĨŝƌŵ ?ƐĐĂƐŚŚŽůĚŝŶŐƐĐĂŶĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚďǇĨŝƌŵ ?Ɛ
growth opportunity. They find that entrenchment effect decrease when Ĩŝƌŵ ?Ɛ
growth opportunities increase because the interests of managers and shareholders 
are better aligned with greater growth opportunities. To control this influence they 
interact the managerial ownership terms with the proxy for growth opportunities. 
Chen and Chuang(2009) examine how corporate governance mechanism affect the 
cash holdings of high growth firms. Using a sample of high tech firms listed on 
NASDAQ, they find that companies hold excess cash to maintain their competitive 
advantage. They argue that board effectiveness could have two different implications 
for these cash holdings: an effective board might reduce information asymmetries 
therefore reducing the cost of external financing. Consequently, this will decrease the 
Ĩŝƌŵ ?ƐĐĂƐŚŚŽůĚŝŶŐƐ ?DŽreover, effective board can also provide shareholders better 
protection from managerial agency issues, so that managers of firms with lots of 
growth opportunities to hold more cash. Chen and Chuang(2009) also suggest that 
shareholders of high growth companies can accept high levels of cash if they think 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐĐĂŶƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? 
 
>ĂƐƚůǇ ? ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞ Ĩŝƌŵ ?Ɛ ĐĂƐŚ ŚŽůĚŝŶŐ ŝƐ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚ ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ Ă ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŽƌ
ĂŵŽŶŐ ƚŚĞ Ĩŝƌŵ ?Ɛ ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ? ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌ ƚŽ managers by 
shareholders can enhance alleviating the agency problem between managers and 
shareholders. The shareholders with relatively small proportion of shares sometimes 
lack of incentive to monitor managers as the cost of monitoring is likely to outweigh 
the benefit. In contrast, large shareholders, having more inventive to monitor 
manages as they hold more shares. As a result, companies with large shareholders 
will have lower agency costs and lower cost of external financing. This means 
Company with large shareholders are expected to have lower level of cash. 
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2.3. Some other variables influence the cash holding of company 
Bank relationship  
ƐďĂŶŬƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞ ŝŶŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐĨŝƌŵƐ ?ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚ ŝŶĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŶŐĂŶĚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶŐ
the information that not public available. Therefore, bank financing is regarded as 
more effective than public debt in decreasing issues associated with agency conflicts 
and informational asymmetry(Ozkan and Ozkan,1996). Moreover, as banks can 
access to the information that not public available, it allow banks to evaluate and 
monitor borrowers more effectively than other lenders. That means if a bank willing 
to lend company money that means positive information about that company. 
Furthermore, the positive signal about a company provided by banks allows this 
company to access to external finance more easily. Therefore, this argument suggests 
that companies with more bank debt in their capital structures should hold less cash 
(Ozkan and Ozkan,1996).  
 
Growth opportunity 
Mangnus(2011) investigate 25 EU countries for the period from 1988 to 2010, find 
that the most important determinants of changes in cash holdings are the R&D ratio, 
the cash flow volatility and the net working capital ratio. Together these firm 
characteristics explain 85% of the change in the predicted cash holdings. This finding 
is constant with the precautionary motive for cash holdings. Companies that have 
more growth opportunities and higher levels of risk hold more cash to reduce 
possible adversity in the future.  
 
Investor protection 
Pinkowitz (2003) find that countries with better investor protection hold less cash. 
Kusnadi (2003) provide additional evidence of the importance of corporate 
governance in the determination corporate cash holdings and the relevance of the 
16 
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agency cost theory. This is constant with findings by Dittmar et al(2003) that firms 
with poor shareholders protection face more severe agency problem and hold higher 
cash levels. 
Diversified  
Subramaniam et al (2009) investigate whether the organizational structure of firms 
affects their cash holdings. Using Compustat firm level and segment-level data, they 
find that diversified companies hold much less cash than their counterparts. Due to 
the diversified firms have the potential to use internal capital markets and proceeds 
from sales of non-core assets, and hence would have less need to hold cash. 
Moreover, they find that the diversified companies also have more sever agency 
problems, basically much of the agency problem from conflict over resource 
allocation across dimension that increases the marginal cost of cash holdings. 
 
Capital market development 
Dittmar et al(2003) evidence that the level of capital markets development has a 
positive impact on cash holdings. However, Ferreira and Vilela(2003) argue that a 
negative relationship between the level of capital market development and cash 
holding which is not consistent with agency theory however support the 
precautionary motive for cash holdings. 
ROA  
The trade- off theory predicts a negative relationship between return on assets and 
cash holdings ( Ozkan and Ozkan,2002). The pecking order theory, however, predicts 
a positive relationship between return on assets and cash holdings..  
 
3. Variables Constructions and Hypothesis   
 
This part is going to construct seven variables and hypothesis mainly based on 
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trade-off theory, pecking order theory. The seven variables are investment 
opportunity, firm size, profitability, net working capital, leverage, capital expenditures, 
and dividend. I will investigate UK public companies cash holding based on these 
seven variables in later section. 
Investment opportunity  
The agency theory predicts a negative relationship between cash holdings and 
investment opportunities as managers of companies with good investment 
opportunities might better align shareholders interest with managers thus company 
hold less cash. However, Opler et al.(1999) argues a positive relationship between 
investment and cash holdings as they find that companies with more investment 
opportunities might experience higher costs of external financing due to higher costs 
of underinvestment and financial distress. In order to reduce the costs of distress, 
these companies are expected to hold higher levels of cash for precautionary reasons. 
The pecking order theory suggest similar conclusion, it predict a positive relationship 
between investment opportunities and cash holdings because companies have high 
investment opportunities are normally more profitable and thus have more cash. 
 
Bigelli and Vidal(2009) find that the positive relationship between investment 
opportunity and cash holding is stronger for private firms as private suffer from a 
greater risk of underinvestment due to a low level of internally generate funds. 
 
In the literature, investment opportunities are typically measured by the market- 
to-book ratio; in my case, however, as most book value for companies are difficult to 
get in DataStream, so it is hard for me to use market-to-book ratio. Therefore, I 
would follow Daher(2010) measure investment opportunities by the yearly sales 
growth rate . It is expected to find a positive relationship between cash holdings and 
investment opportunities. 
 
H1: Investment opportunities are positively related to cash holdings. 
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Firm size 
Martinez-Carrascal(2010) investigate corporate cash holdings in euro area as a 
function of firm size. He finds that there are significant differences in investment in 
liquid assets for firms of different size. He suggests that liquid assets for smaller firms 
in the euro area are more closely linked to firm cash flow and its variability than cash 
holdings for bigger companies. This is because smaller firms have more restriction 
access to external funds due to information asymmetry. He also finds that the 
relationship between cash holding and tangible assets, which help to get external 
finance, is stronger for small and medium-sized companies than large companies. In 
contrast, he point out that cash holding sensitivity to variations in the spread 
between the return on liquid assets and other uses of these funds is higher for larger 
companies, can be explained by their lower need to hold a cash buffer for 
precautionary reasons. This finding is constant with Han and Qiu ?s study about role of 
financial constrains in the link between corporate cash holdings and cash flow 
variability. They find that the cash holdings of smaller firms respond positively to 
cash flow variability, however large ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ? liquid assets do not react to changes 
in this variable. They argue that if a company is not restricted access to external 
funds such as large companies, then it has no need to provide for future investment 
and thus its cash policies should not affected by cash flow variability. Titman and 
Wessels(1998) argued that as larger firms are more likely to diversified so that they 
are less likely to have financial distress problems. In contrast, small firms are more 
likely to be liquidated when they are financial distress( Ozkan and Ozkan,1996) . 
Accordingly, small companies are expected to hold more cash to avoid financial 
distress. However, Ogundipe et al(2012) investigate a sample of 54 Nigerian firms 
listed on Nigerian Stock Exchange for a period of 15 have a different result, which 
show that firm size is insignificant as cash holding determinants in Nigeria. 
 
I measure firm size as the logarithm of book assets. It is expected that a negative 
relationship between firm size and cash holdings. 
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H2: firm size negatively related to cash holdings 
Profitability 
The trade-off theory suggests a negative relationship between profitability and cash 
holdings since profitable companies have enough cash flows to avoid 
underinvestment issues.(Kim et al., 1998;Caglayan-Ozkan and Ozkan,2002). Bates et 
al.(2009) find a negative relationship between profitability and cash holdings. 
However, Megginson and Wei(2010) investigated the determinants of cash holdings 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨĐĂƐŚŝŶŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƐŚĂƌĞ-issue privatized firms from 1993 to 2007. They 
found that more profitable and high growth firms hold more cash. 
 
The profitability measured by cash-flow-to-book-value-of-asset. Cash flow is 
computed as earnings after interest, dividends and tax but before depreciation. It is 
ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĂŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐĂƐŚŚŽůĚŝŶŐƐĂŶĚĨŝƌŵƐ ?ƉƌŽĨŝƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? 
 
H3ILUPV¶SURILWDELOLW\QHJDWLYHO\UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKFDVKholdings. 
Net working capital 
The net working capital consists of assets that substitute for cash ,which are normally 
defined as inventories, accounts receivables, accounts payable and other items in the 
working capital that are used to change cash levels(Bates et al,2009). Opler et al. 
(1999) suggest that there is no relationship between liquid assets substitute and cash 
holding based on the pecking order theory. Since liquid assets substitutes can be 
easily converted to cash, therefore the trade-off theory suggests a negative 
relationship between cash holdings and liquid assets substitutes. Ferreira and 
Vilela(2003) find a negative relationship between net working capital ratio and cash 
holdings, as companies have fewer assets that can function as a substitute for cash, 
which is constant with transaction motive for cash holdings. This findings also 
supported by Afza and Adnan(2007), Megginson and Wei(2010) and Alam et 
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al.(2011).  
 
We measure liquid assets substitutes by net-working-capital-capital-to-assets. We 
calculate net working capital as current assets less currents liabilities and subtract 
cash from the result.  
It is expected to find a negative relationship between liquid asset substitutes and 
cash holding for our sample. 
 
H4: liquid asset substitutes have a negative relationship with cash holdings 
 
Leverage  
Both the pecking order theories and trade-off theory suggest a negative relationship 
between leverage and cash holdings. Ferreira and Vilela( 2004) use a sample of 400 
firms in 12 Economic and Monetary Union(EMU) countries for the period of 
1987-2000 to investigate the determinants of corporate cash holdings. They find that 
cash and leverage are negatively related, because less levered firms are subject to 
less external monitoring and thus allow more managerial discretion resulting in 
higher cash levels. However, Ogundipe et al (2012) find that a positive relationship 
between holdings and leverage is constant with agency theory that highly leveraged 
companies find it hard and costly to access to external funds hence, hold higher level 
of cash and induce a positive relationship. 
The leverage will be measured as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current 
liabilities divided by the book value of total assets. It is expected to have a negative 
relationship between leverage and cash holdings. 
 
H5  ILUPV¶OHYHUDJHOHYHOQHJDWLYHO\UHODWHGWRFDVKKROGLQJV 
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Capital Expenditures 
The capital expenditures are expenditures are used to generate future 
benefits(Bates,2009). A capital expenditure is incurred when a business spends 
money either to buy fixed assets or to add to the value of an existing fixed asset with 
a useful life extending beyond the taxable year. Previous U.S studies (e.g.Opler et 
al.,(1999) and Kim et al., (1998)) validate the trade-off theory. The cash level increase 
with the capital expenditure of company because companies with high capital 
expenditures keep cash as a shield against transaction costs together with external 
finance and opportunity costs of insufficient resources(Daher,2010). However, the 
pecking order theory predicts a negative relationship between capital expenditures 
and cash holdings because pronounced capital spending typically drains out a firm ?s 
cash(Daher,2010). 
 
Capital expenditures are measured by the annual change in fixed assets added to 
depreciation. It is expected that a negative relationship between cash holdings and 
capital expenditure.  
 
H6: capital expenditures are negatively related to cash holdings 
 
Dividend 
Finally, Al-Najjar and Belghitar(2011) explores the relationship between corporate 
cash holdings and dividend policy using a large sample of around 400 non-financial 
companies for the period from 1991 to 2008. The result shows that cash holdings are 
affected by dividend because dividend firms that currently pay dividend are expected 
to hold less cash as they are more capable of raising funds when needed by cutting 
dividend. In contrast, Drobetz and Gruninger(2007) investigated the determinants of 
cash holdings for a comprehensive sample of 156 Swiss non-financial companies 
between 1995 and 2004. Through regression analysis, they found that dividend 
payments are positively related to cash holdings.  
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H7: Dividends are negatively related to cash holdings. 
4. Different corporate governance of UK  
 
Due to most past studies and researches were conducted in the U.S. companies, I 
would like to talk about some characteristics of the UK corporate governance system 
before I describe the methodology and data. Several characteristics of the UK 
corporate governance system make the cash holding situation is different from US 
companies which may contribute to a high degree of managerial discretion, which 
may have a significant influence on managerial ownership and cash holdings. It is 
going to focus on institutional shareholders and board composition, and the role of 
regulation. 
Institutional shareholders 
The ownership of listed shares by financial institutions (including insurance 
companies, pension funds and unit and investment trusts) both in the U.K. and the 
US are very high. Fifty years ago, most shares in UK were held by individuals, who 
were advised by stockbrokers with direct knowledge of both their investors and the 
companies in which they invested. By the 1990, this structure had been changed to 
one in which UK shares were largely owned by financial institutions, initially 
insurance companies and pension funds 
(bis.gov.uk). Although the proportion owned by insurance companies and pension 
funds are decreasing recently, especially from 1998 to 2010, financial institution still 
holds a significant amount of shares in UK. From the ownership of UK Quoted Shares 
report 2010, it shows that financial institutions held over 40 percent of total quoted 
shares in UK which can be seen from the Figure 1 and Figure 2 below.  
 
Figure 1: Beneficial Ownership of UK shares at 31st December 2010                  
23 
The Cash Holdings of UK Public firms 
 
  Source from: (ons.gov.uk) 
 
 
 
  
 Figure 2: Beneficial Ownership of UK by Value (from 1998 to 2010) 
 
 
   Source from: (ons.gov.uk) 
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Percentage of UK stock market owned by value 
Holdings of UK quoted shares by sector of benefical owner
At 31 December for 1998, 2008 and 2010
1998 2008 2010 1998 2008 2010
Rest of the world 30.7 41.5 41.2 460.9 481.1 732.6
Insurance companies 21.6 13.4 8.6 325.5 154.9 153.6
Pension funds 21.7 12.8 5.1 325.8 148.8 91.3
Individuals 16.7 10.2 11.5 250.8 117.8 204.5
Unit trusts 2.0 1.8 6.7 30.1 21.3 118.8
Investment trusts 1.3 1.9 2.1 19.2 22.1 37.2
Other financial institutions 2.7 10.0 16.0 40.4 115.3 284.5
Charities, church, etc 1.4 0.8 0.9 20.4 8.7 15.1
Private non-financial companies 1.4 3.0 2.3 20.9 34.7 40.3
Public sector 0.1 1.1 3.1 1.4 13.0 54.4
Banks 0.6 3.5 2.5 8.4 40.6 45.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 1503.7 1158.4 1777.5
per cent £ billion
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The ownership situation in US is quite similar with it in UK which can be seen from   
the Figure 3 below. The equity hold by institution investors is increased from 6.1% 
to 61% during the period from 1950 to 2010. 
 
 
  Figure 3: Beneficial Ownership of U.S. by Value (From 1945 to 2010) 
 
       Source: (valuewalk.com) 
 
It is explained that the reason of the significant increase in the ownership of 
institutions is that the growth in long-term saving lead to the increase in funds 
available to the institutions for investment (Stapledon,2000). Furthermore, tax is 
considered as an important role in the institutionalization of the UK equity market. 
This is because the investment for some financial institution are exempt from capital 
gains tax , such as pension fund and some firms have tax privileges like life insurance 
companies.  
 
Given the aggregate size of institutional ownership in the UK equity market, one 
important question to find is how effective those institutional shareholders are in UK 
corporate issues. The fact is although the high proportion ownership of financial 
institutions, investors is not major players from a principal-agent perspective. There 
are several reasons seem to influence the extent to which institutional investors 
25 
The Cash Holdings of UK Public firms 
activism. First, the ownership in institution investors highly dispersed. Although their 
accumulated share stakes are very high, shareholdings in individual companies are 
small: the average of the largest shareholding owned by institutions amounts to only 
5.5 percent. Therefore the benefits shareholders can get from monitoring 
corporations can hardly outweigh the costs of control for institutions, so that it 
makes institutions to free ride on corporate control (Shleifer and Vishny ,1997).  
 
Second, some investment and pension funds adopt passive index strategies. Active 
strategy is trying to find the right share by study and investigate. In contrast, the 
passive investment is a strategy that involves minimal expectational input and 
instead relies on diversification to match the performance of some market index. It 
assumes that the market will reflect all available information in the price paid for 
securities and therefore, does not attempt to find mispriced securities. Comparing 
with active management, passive management is less costly; this is because active 
management takes time to do research, and actively managed funds spend more 
money on overhead and staffing. Moreover, they have higher trading costs because 
they move in and out of stocks. If the index earns 10%, and the fund has 3% a year in 
costs, it must earn 13% just to have a net return equivalent to its index. As passive 
fund do not do many trading as active trading do, they have lower fees, and also 
have less capital gains distributions that will flow through to tax return(about.com). 
Consequently, passive invest fund do not dispose of the resources to actively monitor 
the large number of firms in their portfolios. In order to remain cost-efficient, 
institutional investors choose to give up poorly performing companies instead of 
engaging in active monitoring.  
 
Third, the low institutional involvement is also affected by insider-trading regulations. 
If firms do not willing to fix part of their portfolios, they might have to restrict active 
involvement in corporate strategy(Goergen and Renneboog,1999). Plender(1997) 
finds that financial institutions in the UK do not frequently vote at shareholders ? 
meeting since they are not obligated to do so as they are in the US. He finds that only 
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about 28 percent of pension funds vote on a regular basis whereas 21 percent never 
vote and 32 percent cast their vote only on extraordinary items.  
 
An essential issue in the whole debate about shareholder activism and the role of 
institutional investors in corporate governance is the whether or not such 
intervention results in higher financial performance in investee companies. There are 
many studies that have attempted to address this issue. It is clearly an implicit 
assumption of the Hampel Committee and other proponents of shareholder activism 
that institutional invests ? intervention in investee companies produces higher 
financial returns. There are certainly a perception among the institutional investment 
community that activism brings financial rewards, as more efficient monitoring of 
company management aligns shareholder and manager interests and therefore helps 
to maximize shareholder wealth(Solomon,2007). Franks and Mayer(1994) showed 
that institutional investors have a significant impact on top management turnover, 
which is interpreted as positive for corporate governance, as this tends to result in 
improved financial performance. Similar evidence was presented for Japan by Kaplan 
and Minton(1994) and Kang and Shivdasani(1995). 
Further, some research has shown that block purchases of shares by institutional 
investors tended to result in an increase in company value, top management 
turnover, financial performance and asset sales (Mikkelson and Ruback,1985). 
 
Board structure of UK companies 
Boards fall into two general models, a unitary board or a two-tier board. The UK has 
a unitary board structure which tends to be the most common form, especially in 
countries which have been influenced by the Anglo-Saxon style of corporate 
governance. Unitary boards include executive and non- executive directors and the 
chairman of the board can at the same time be an executive officer(Solomon,2007). 
On the other hand, two-tier boards have two separate boards, a management board 
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and a supervisory board. Thus one-tier board compared to two-tier boards face a 
dilemma: they should make decisions while monitor these decisions. However, this 
problem does not exist in the two-tier system due to the inherent formal separation 
of control and management, it is necessary to get this separation in the one-tier 
system. This encourages the need for some board members to be neutral and to 
concentrate their efforts on the monitoring task. This has lead to a further class of 
board members: within the group of the non-executive directors, only some are 
deemed independent. However, the main problem of this structure about the 
independence of outside directors and their ability to monitor and control executive 
directors( see, e.g, Blair,1995). It is also crucial to find that there is no formal rules for 
companies in the UK to have outside directors and company boards can function 
without outsider representation (Ozkan and Ozkan,2003). The result of these issues 
are influence the board composition of firms. Ozkan and Ozkan (2003) find that 298 
companies have less than three non-executive directors on their boards in 1997, 
which occupied 35.5% of the sample. They also find that the average percentage of 
non-executive directors is 43 and non-executive directors have a majority of the 
board in only 208 firms, which are 24.8 of the sample. Lastly, it is argued that 
non-executive directors in UK play a more advisory role rather than performing a 
disciplinary function. It has been also stated that non-executive directors are not 
active in disciplining management in the UK due to non-executive directors are well 
aware of their strategic role but less so of their monitoring role(Jungmann,2006). 
So based on the discussion above, the outsider board directors are more effective 
monitor and control managers. Therefore, for UK firms ? boards, the inside directors 
as dominators in boards are not likely to play an important role in reducing the 
exercise of managerial discretion. 
 
Role of regulation 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2003) argue that as the insufficient external market discipline and 
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more loosening regulatory controlling firms and company boards in the UK is more 
possible to give managers greater freedom to realize their own benefit. It is argue 
that the regulatory features in the UK have an important role in influence the form of 
corporate governance. The US and UK approaches have been quite different.  “  In 
UK, the emphasis over the past few decades has been building up a voluntary code, 
and morphing that into the self-ĚĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ  ‘ĐŽŵƉůǇ Žƌ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ? ? ? dŚĞ
corporate governance regulations in UK start from the publication of the Cadbury 
Report in 1992, which had been improved by late 1980s collapse of the Maxwell 
group (para 9,thecqi.org). However, due to the non-enforceability, the effects are 
doubted. In contrast, the Sox full compliance in the US is very expensive and a trend 
has started where US start-up companies prefer to list in London on the alternate 
investments market where regulations are looser and listing costs are much lower. 
With more money now being raised on initial public offerings in London than in New 
York for the first time since 2000, it has been found that the US companies do not 
willing to apply SOX regulations are taking the easy way and moving to London. One 
US firm that choose to listed on London market rather than in the US explained 
because it would have taken 18 months longer and cost an extra $ 1m due to SOX 
compliance regulations(thecqi.org). Moreover, Franks et al.(2001) state that there are 
some different regulatory futures in the UK despite the characterization of the UK as 
having a common law regulatory system(Franks et al.,2001). The UK Takeover Code 
makes accumulation of controlling blocks expensive. Moreover, UK has stronger 
minority protection laws due to the highly dispersed ownership. This  “discouraging 
partial accumulation of share blocks in favor of full acquisitions in takeovers ?, making 
share blocks a weak disciplining device. Third, the obligations regulatory on directors 
in UK are not sufficient which lead to non- executive directors are more advisory 
rather than disciplinary. Furthermore, some studies suggest that the regulatory 
restrictions on the shareholdings of those financial institutions in UK are far fewer 
than that those in US(See. E.g., Allen and Gale,2000). 
 
In this part, we have discussed the role of institutional investors, board structure, and 
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role of regulatory. As Solomon(2007) state that more active shareholding can result 
in better monitoring of company management and therefore to a lessening of the 
agency problem. Therefore, the institutions ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ ? activism, structure of board 
and role of regulatory influence the efficient monitoring of company management 
aligns shareholder and manager interests, therefore based on agency motive, low 
involvement in corporate governance of institutional investors, managerial discretion  
and loosening regulatory would result in poorer align interest between investors and 
managers thus companies hold more cash. Therefore, it is expected that UK 
companies have higher average cash ratio than those companies with similar size in 
US. 
5. Data description 
For the analysis I use a dataset that contains annual fundamentals of UK firms for the 
period from 1990 to 2010. I concentrate on testing the hypotheses developed in 
previous section. A sample of publicly traded UK companies has been selected from 
both a cross-sectional and a time series dimension, which allows for an analysis of 
different companies over time. The initial data is obtained for this study is from the 
Datastream database which provides both accounting data for companies and 
market value of equity. The panel data set for this paper has been constructed as 
follows. First of all, the data does not include financial companies, as their business 
involves inventories of marketable securities that are in cash, and because of their 
need to meet statutory capital requirements(Opler,1999). Second, I also exclude 
Utilities Company, because their cash holdings can be affected by regulatory 
supervision. Third, missing firm- year observations for any variable in the model 
during the sample period were dropped. Lastly, from these firms, only those with at 
least five continuous time series observations during the sample period have been 
chosen. The initial sample contains more than 600 public companies in FTSE of UK 
with approximately 18723 firm-year observations. Each firm-year observation 
contains information on cash ratio and five independent variables which are 
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described later in this part. The model I use is the model employed by Bates et 
al.(2009) that relate the cash ratio to firm characteristics, and tailor these regressions 
to fit the characteristics of our sample.  
 
The dependent variable that is used in the regression analysis is the cash ratio, which 
is defined in several different ways. The easiest way uses only cash and short-term 
marketable securities which are divided by total assets. Instead of dividing by total 
assets one can also divide by net assets, which is equals the book value of assets 
minus cash and marketable securities(Bates et al.,2009).In addition, the logarithm of  
the cash to net assets ratio can be used In order to reduce the problem of 
outliers(Foley, Hartzell, Titman and Twite,2007). In my research I use the cash to total 
assets ratio as dependent variable.  
 
The Table 1 and Figure 4 below illustrate the average cash ratios from 1990 to 2010. 
The third column of Table 1 reports the average cash ratio in each year, and there are 
605 companies in total. The ratio is 9.85% in 1990 and increases to 20.7% in 2010, 
reaching a peak time in 2005. Comparing with the result obtained by Bates et 
al(2009), it can be found that the average cash ratio of UK public companies is similar 
with those of the United States for each year in the sample, which it is not constant 
with what I expected before that UK companies would have higher cash level. Bates 
et al.(2009) show that the average cash ratio of the large firm in U.S increases from 7%  
in 1980 to 11% in 2006, peaking in 2004. The same trend is conveyed by the median 
cash ratio, which is presented in the third column. As we can see that the increase is 
not obvious, this is constant with the results from study and research conducted by 
Bates et al.(2009) . Bates et al.(2009) investigate a number of 13599 firms include 
both public and private firms, and classified all firms into three quintiles based on 
firm size. They find that cash ratios changes are markedly more pronounced in 
smaller firms and the large firms are fairly stable over time. As the companies I use in 
this paper are all large public companies, therefore the changes in cash ratio are 
small as expected.  
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Table1:  
year N 
Average 
Cash ratio 
CashRatio 
Median 
Average 
Net debt 
NetDebt 
Median  
Average 
Leverage 
ratio 
Leverage 
Median 
1990 251 0.0985 0.0614 0.0817 0.0837 0.1757 0.1464 
1991 268 0.0893 0.0554 0.0955 0.0816 0.1848 0.1502 
1992 276 0.0926 0.0616 0.1177 0.0845 0.2104 0.1623 
1993 287 0.0999 0.0590 0.2204 0.0689 0.3203 0.1569 
1994 303 0.0975 0.0607 0.2858 0.0625 0.3833 0.1478 
1995 318 0.0954 0.0521 0.2748 0.0664 0.3702 0.1445 
1996 351 0.1044 0.0574 0.2048 0.0605 0.3092 0.1432 
1997 370 0.1114 0.0700 0.1984 0.0544 0.3098 0.1338 
1998 380 0.1082 0.0666 0.4137 0.0813 0.5220 0.1519 
1999 390 0.0956 0.0515 0.4235 0.0924 0.5192 0.1566 
2000 408 0.0946 0.0495 0.1033 0.1047 0.1979 0.1534 
2001 433 0.0919 0.0526 0.1112 0.1065 0.2031 0.1651 
2002 459 0.0984 0.0548 0.1099 0.1048 0.2083 0.1642 
2003 480 0.1009 0.0576 0.1108 0.1020 0.2117 0.1689 
2004 506 0.1118 0.0647 0.0983 0.0763 0.2101 0.1531 
2005 523 0.1150 0.0601 0.0710 0.0734 0.1860 0.1346 
2006 544 0.1126 0.0561 0.0727 0.0645 0.1854 0.1357 
2007 577 0.1036 0.0517 0.0940 0.0854 0.1977 0.1468 
2008 569 0.1058 0.0578 0.1096 0.1021 0.2154 0.1700 
2009 572 0.1045 0.0645 0.1009 0.0855 0.2055 0.1560 
2010 575 0.1070 0.0583 0.0722 0.0709 0.1793 0.1418 
Figure 3:  The Average Cash Ratio , Average Debt ratio, Average Leverage 
Ratio  
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The results for average cash ratio, average leverage ratio and average net debt are 
similar with the results obtained by Daher for UK public firms (2010).   
 
Then it turns to the implications of the increase in the cash ratio for the 
measurement of leverage. Column 7 of Table 1 illustrate average leverage ratio for 
my sample companies by year. I calculate leverage as total debt divided by total book 
assets. It can be seen that the leverage ratio increased dramatically from 17.5% to 
52.2% during the period from 1990 to 1999 and decreased from 51.9% in 2000 to 
17.9% in 2010. When we consider the average net leverage ratio, which subtracts 
cash from debt, Bates et al(2009) find that the net debt ratio change has a 
dramatically different perspective from leverage ratio in their US sample. Their study 
show that average leverage ratio increase from 1980 to 1998 then decreased from 
1998 to2010. While the average net debt ratio is 16.4% in 1980 and falls during 15 
years and reaches negative in the last 3 years of the sample. However, the fifth 
column in table1 shows the average net leverage for my sample. It can be found that 
average leverage ratio and average net debt have a similar change pattern in this 
study, which is not constant with Bates et al (2009) results. The Figure 1 shows the 
change of leverage ratio and debt ratio both increase from 1990 to 1998 although 
there is a slightly decrease in 1996, and decrease dramatically around 1998 to 2000. 
The difference result between Bates et al(2009) and my result probably due to they 
include private companies in their sample. Median net leverage, presented in the 
column 6, is decrease from 1990 to 1997 then increase from 1998 to2010.  
 
We next turn to discuss the role of dividend. Jensen(1986) states that companies pay 
no dividend with poor growth opportunities will hold more cash. The Table 2 below 
illustrates the average cash ratio for dividend and nondividend payers from 1990 to 
2010. It can be seen from the Figure 4 that the cash ratio increase is more obvious in 
nondividend payers than dividend payers. For instance, the average cash ratio of 
dividend payers is about the same in 2010 as in 1990. In contrast, the average cash 
ratio of nondividend payers is 67.5% higher in 2010 than in 1990 This result is similar 
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with the result obtained by Bates et al(2009). Almeida,Campello, and Weisbach(2004) 
suggest that non dividend paying companies to be financially constrained , which 
indicate that cash holding increase happened in financially constrained companies. 
The result that nondividend companies have higher cash holdings is also support the 
precautionary motive. 
 
Table 2: Cash Ratios from 1990 to 2010 Delineated by the Dividend 
 
Nondividend Dividend 
1990 0.167295 0.093728 
1991 0.092995 0.049967 
1992 0.094077 0.077946 
1993 0.101522 0.077897 
1994 0.099599 0.078508 
1995 0.09848 0.065913 
1996 0.09784 0.152973 
1997 0.102985 0.177161 
1998 0.099754 0.177000 
1999 0.087411 0.158612 
2000 0.076322 0.157085 
2001 0.080073 0.147883 
2002 0.08368 0.159626 
2003 0.087011 0.149926 
2004 0.091454 0.181166 
2005 0.099832 0.177474 
2006 0.098566 0.172764 
2007 0.092046 0.16571 
2008 0.095965 0.166759 
2009 0.098617 0.127555 
2010 0.096129 0.153254 
Figure 4 :Cash Ratios from 1990 to 2010 Delineated by 
the Dividend 
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Time trend analysis 
Following Bates, Kahle and Stulz(2009) the next part is going to find out if the 
observed pattern in the cash ratio is statistically significant. I estimate regressions of 
the cash ratio on the constant and a time variable. The results are show in the table2 
below. It can be seen that for the average cash ratio in the table 2 the time variable 
has a coefficient of 0.0065, which means that the cash ratio increases with 0.65 per 
year on average and has a p-value below 0.01. The R2 of the regression is 31.58%. 
This evidence is consistent with a positive time trend in cash holdings over the 
sample periods. However, such regressions are only useful to characterize the 
evolution of the cash holdings during the sample period, and it would not make 
sense to the in-sample trend to future years(Bates, Kahle and Stulz,2009). I also 
estimate regressions of average leverage ratio on the constant and a time variable. 
However, the regression result shows that the coefficient on leverage for sample 
companies indicates a yearly decrease of 0.005, but it is insignificant with a p-value 
of 0.147 and an R2 equals to 0.1073. The net leverage ratio regression on a constant 
and time result also in an insignificant decrease each year with the negative 
correlation coefficient of 0.006. 
 
6. Empirical findings 
In the section 3, it discussed that how firm characteristics can affect the increase in 
amount of cash hold by company. In this section, I am going to focus on testing the 
hypotheses created in section 3. I use a model of regression used by Bates et al.(2009) 
that relate the cash ratio to firm characteristics. 
 
Explanatory variables and Methodology 
It has been discussed what factors are considered as determinants of the increasing 
cash holdings from the previous literatures, and explained the theories that could 
have implications on the relationship between cash holdings and these determinants. 
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The independent variables in the regression models are mainly focus on the 
transaction and precautionary motives for corporate holding cash. It is going to 
briefly summarize all the determinants that will be tested in this paper, because 
some of the variables mentioned in Section 3 will not be tested due to difficult get 
data and information.  
 
a. Sales Growth Rate: Measures investment opportunities; the most common 
way to calculate is the market-to-book ratio. However, I will use the way 
Daher(2010) applied, which use sales growth rate calculated as yearly 
difference between beginning of year and year-end sales divided by 
beginning of year sales. It is expected there is a positive relationship between 
investment opportunity and cash holdings as companies have higher 
investment opportunities find it costly for them to be financially constrained 
(Bates et al., 2009).  
b. Firm Size: due to the economies of scale, larger companies hold less cash. The 
firm size will be measured as the logarithm of book assets. 
c. Cash flow to Assets: some views suggest that cash flows have positive 
relationship with cash holdings however others argue that cash flows have 
negative relationship with cash holding levels. Cash flows are measured as 
EBIT minus interest dividends and tax plus depreciation. 
d. Net Working Capital to Assets: It suggest that net working capital and cash 
holding have a negative relationship because working capital includes liquid 
assets which substitute for cash. Net working capital is measured as current 
assets minus current liabilities and cash divided by total asset 
e. Capital Expenditures to Assets: it is suggest that companies with higher 
capital expenditure have lower level of cash holdings. Capital expenditure will 
be measured as yearly change in fixed assets added to depreciation. 
f. Leverage: As cash usually used to pay off outstanding debt therefore cash is 
regarded as negative debt. Hence it should be expected that there is a 
negative relationship between cash holdings and debt. However, others argue 
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that companies with higher debt should hold cash since higher debt increase 
the probability of bankruptcy, and thus a positive relationship between 
leverage and cash holdings could be expected. Leverage is measured as the 
total debt divided by the book value of total assets. 
 
g. Dividend: Dividend firms that currently pay dividend are expected to hold less 
cash as they are more capable of raising funds when needed by cutting 
dividend. Therefore it is expected that a negative relationship between cash 
ratio and dividend. The dividend variable will be measure as dummy variable, 
taking value of 1 if company pays dividend and 0 otherwise.  
 
 
 
 
Table3 
Variable Name Measurement Predicted 
Cash Ratio  (Cash and cash equivalent + short term investment)/ 
Total Assets 
 
Sales Growth Rate (Beginning of year + Year-end sales) / by beginning of 
year sales 
Positive 
Firm Size Logarithm of book assets Negative 
Cash Flow to Assets (EBIT-interest-dividends-tax+depreciation)/Total 
Assets 
Negative 
Net Working Capital (Current assets minus Current liabilities and cash) 
/total asset 
Negative 
Capital Expenditures to 
Assets 
yearly change in fixed assets added to 
depreciation/Total assets 
Negative 
Leverage total debt/the book value of total assets Negative 
Dividend Dummy ŽŵƉĂŶǇǁŝƚŚĚŝǀŝĚĞŶĚ “ ? ? ?ŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞƚĂŬĞ “ ? ? Negative 
 
Table3 above shows the seven variables, how these variables are measured and the 
predicted relationship with cash holding. I will run three sets of regression models: 
variants of the basic least squares regression of the cash ratio on explanatory 
variables, regressions testing changes in variables rather than their levels, and lastly 
interaction regressions that allow for intercept and slope changes.  
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Models and Results 
Least Squares Regression Models 
The first model is going to use is the basic cash ratio regression model, which runs 
the regression of the cash ratio on seven variables discussed in previous section. The 
Table 4 presents OLS and panel regressions of cash on the independent variables 
described earlier 
Table 4 
Model                     1                          2 
Dependen
t Variables 
 
Cash Ratio=ɲ A? ɴ1.Sales Growth + 
ɴ2 ?^ŝǌĞA?ɴ3 ?&A㴂W4 ?EtA㴂W5 ?WyA㴂W6.Lev
ĞƌĂŐĞA?ɴ7.Diviend Dum       
Cash Ratio= ɲA?ɴ1.Sales Growth +ɴ2.Size + 
ɴ3.CF+ɴ4.NWC+ɴ5.CAPEX+ɴ6 ?>ĞǀĞƌĂŐĞA?ɴ7.
DiviendDum+ɴ8.Year Dummy 
Sample          All public firms                  All public firms 
Intercept            .126341 
                    (0.000) 
.123893 
(0.000) 
Sales Growth        -6.85e-06   
                    (0.164) 
-6.87e-06 
(0.162) 
Firm Size           -.016201  
                    (0.000 )                                                               
-.015868   
(0.000) 
Cash Flow           .258591 
                    (0.000) 
.259152 
(0.000) 
Net Working Capital   -.272695 
                    (0.000) 
-.273360 
(0.000) 
Capital Expenditure    -.071794 
                    (0.003) 
-.076356 
(0.002) 
Leverage Ratio        -.107461 
(0.000) 
-.106803 
(0.000) 
Dividend            .056173 
                    (0.017) 
                
.055267 
(0.018) 
Year                                      .003900 
(0.132) 
Adjusted R
2 
           22.97%                        22.99% 
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The coefficient on sales growth rate with a value of smaller than negative 0.0001, 
and it is insignificant as its p value equal to 0.164. Hence I conclude that investment 
ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĚŽŶŽƚĂĨĨĞĐƚĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ?ĐĂƐŚƌĂƚŝŽŝŶƚŚŝƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŵŽĚĞů ? This is not 
accordance with the precautionary motive which suggests that firms with better 
investment opportunities hold more cash since adverse shocks and financial distress 
are more costly for them(Bates ,Kahle and Stulz,2009)  
 
The coefficient on size has a value of negative 0.0162, and p value of 0, which 
indicates firm size, has a significant negative relationship with company cash ratio. 
This is consistent with transaction motive, which state that larger company hold less 
cash since there are economies of scale with the transaction motive. There is much 
studies have the same conclusion such as See,Mulligan(1997). Moreover, the result 
also accordance with the agency motive, since agency motive suggests that due to 
information asymmetric, large companies hold less cash as they can get external fund 
easier than small companies.  
 
The coefficient on cash flow ratio has a positive value of 0.258 and p value of 0.000, 
which reflects that companies with higher cash flow have higher cash ratio. This is 
consistent with Daher(2010) and DĞŐŐŝŶƐŽŶ ĂŶĚ tĞŝ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?Ɛstudies results. 
Megginson and Wei(2010) found that more profitable companies with high growth 
rate hold more cash ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƐƚƵĚŝĞĚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƐŚĂƌĞ-issue privatized firms. However, it 
is not accordance with trade-off theory. According to trade-off theory, profitable 
companies hold less cash as they generate enough cash flows to avoid any 
underinvestment problems. 
 
The coefficient on the net working capital with a value of negative 0.2727, and p 
value equals to 0.000, which means the net working capital has a negative 
relationship with cash ratio in this model. This result is consistent with the result of 
Bates, Kahle and Stulz(2009). Since net working capital and cash are substitutes, 
firms with higher net working capital are expected to hold less cash.  
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The correlation of capital expenditure has a value of negative 0.0717 and p value of 
0.003; in the significant level of 5% it indicates that capital expenditure has negative 
relationship with cash ratio. This result is not consistent with trade off theory which 
predicts a positive relationship between investment (in capital expenditures) and 
cash level. The previous U.S. study by Opler et al.,(1999) and Kim et al.,(1998) also 
find same conclusion.  On the other hand this result is accordance with hierarchy 
view which predicts a negative sign.  
 
The result on leverage support our hypotheses that accordance with most of the 
studies in the literature. The coefficient with a value of negative 0.1074 and p value 
of 0.000, which is similar with the result obtained by Daher(2010). Both the pecking 
order theories and trade-off theory suggest a negative relationship between leverage 
and cash holdings. Ferreira and Vilela( 2004) use a sample of 400 firms in 12 
Economic and Monetary Union(EMU) countries for the period of 1987-2000 to 
investigate the determinants of corporate cash holdings. They also find that cash and 
leverage are negatively related, because less levered firms are subject to less external 
monitoring and thus allow more managerial discretion resulting in higher cash levels. 
 
The coefficient of dividend with a positive value of 0.056 and p value of 0.017,with 
the significant level of 5% which means companies pay dividend have higher cash 
holdings in this model. This findings is not consistent with free cash flow theory 
which suggests that non dividend payers with poor growth opportunities will 
accumulate more cash(Jensen,1986).It is also inconsistent with the result of Table 2. 
 
The R2 value is quite low in this model, only 23.05% indicating that only 23.05% of 
the changes in the cash ratio are explained by changes in the explanatory variables in 
this model.  
 
So based the result above, it can be seen that the results by running the regression of 
the cash-to-assets ratio on the seven variables are consistent with the most past 
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studies and conclusions. In the significant level of 5%, there are two variables have 
been found no relationship with the cash ratio which are sales growth rate and 
dividend, however, dividend is significant in 10% level of significant. The increase 
cash ratio in this model can be largely explained by cash flow to assets, working 
capital to assets and leverage ratio. These results suggest that profitability, liquidity 
and leverage have the main influence on cash holdings of companies. The 
profitability has positive relationship with companies cash holdings, indicates that 
more profitable companies hold more cash which contradictory with trade-off theory. 
Second, liquidity has negative relationship with cash ratio indicates that companies 
with more liquid assets has lower cash holding level, this is consistent with trade-off 
theory and transaction motive. Third, leverage level has a negative relationship with 
company means that companies with higher debt hold less cash which is consistent 
with pecking order theory.  
 
Intercept changes 
Based on the Bates et al(2009), in order to investigate how the intercept change over 
time, identifying an increase in the cash ratio not explained by changes in modeled 
firm characteristics, a dummy variable for the year to be added to the model to let 
intercept shifts over time. The dummy takes the value of 1 if the data is taken before 
2000 and value 0 after 2000. The results show in the figure below.  
 
The coefficient on the year dummy takes positive value of 0.0039, however it is 
insignificant with the value of 0.132. The positive sign indicates that the changes in 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ characteristics result in lower cash ratio than what was observed before 
2000. This result is consistent with the result provided by Daher(2010). It has been 
found that the most of the coefficients on other explanatory variables are almost the 
same with the value and significance to those got in Model1. The R2 value almost no 
change, which just increase from 23.5% to23.8%. 
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Agency Problems 
Based on the agency theory, the dispersion of ownership make the shareholders with 
relatively small proportion of shares sometimes lack of incentive to monitor 
managers as the cost of monitoring is likely to outweigh the benefit. As a result, it 
will make companies have more severed agency problems. The free cash flow theory 
of cash holdings states that companies with less agency issues should have lower 
level of cash holdings because this kind of firms, with fewer entrenched management, 
self-interested managers, cash is applied more efficiently on new investment 
opportunities instead of being used by managers for their own benefits. Anderson 
and Hamadi(2009) explore ownership concentration of company by using a data set 
of Belgian firms, they find that ownership concentration is positively related to the 
level of liquid asset holding, which means companies with more ownership 
concentration have higher level of liquid asset. Moreover, based on the trade-off 
theory, the liquid assets have negative relationship with cash holdings of company. 
Therefore, the companies have higher level of ownership concentration should have 
fewer cash holdings. This is consistent with agency theory and cash flow theory. 
Bates et al (2009) investigate the relationship between cash holdings and agency 
issues by three ways. They applied the GIM index of managerial entrenchment which 
developed by Gompers Ishii and Metrick(2003). They find that companies with the 
highest GIM index values which are thought to have most entrenched management 
that hold smallest amount of cash from 1980 to 2006, which is not consistent with 
Pan(2007) that suggest companies with a high GIM index are more likely to pay 
dividends and have a higher payout ratio. Moreover, their study suggests that due to 
agency problem, the increase of cash holding will result in the money value decrease. 
Third, they find a negative relationship between the future growth of cash holdings 
and excess cash balances which is not accordance with agency theory. 
 
In this part, I am going to use variants of Model 1 to test the effect of ownership 
structure and agency conflicts on cash holdings. I will follow the model that Hou and 
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Robison(2006) applied. Based on Lakhal(2005), the Herfindahl index is used as the 
proxy of ownership concentration. The Hertindahl(H) index is measured as the sum 
of the square percentage share owned by the top five largest shareholders in a firm 
including families, financial institutions, inside shareholders and other outside block 
shareholders(Jiang and Habib,2009). The higher the H index value means the higher 
the ownership concentration in the firm. The formula shows how to calculate firm 
concentration by using Herfindahl Index as follows: 
Hj=  ? ୧୨ଶ୧୍ୀଵ  ࡿ࢏࢐ represent the shareholding of each shareholder 
Hj  represent the sum squares of percentage share owned by five biggest investors. 
 
I run Model 3 on all companies by adding the H index to model 1 as a new 
independent variable. The Model 3 summarized below: 
 
Due to the data availability on the ownership concentration, I have to reduce the 
number of observations that result in a smaller sample size. I only have 60 public 
firms H index data. The result of model 3 can be seen in the table below.  The 
coefficient of h index is smaller than negative 0.0001 and it is insignificant with p 
value of 0.465, which indicates ownership concentration does not affect the 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐĐĂƐŚƌĂƚŝŽ ?dŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŝƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌ ƐƵůƚŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚďǇĂŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
When I run the model 3 with h index, the coefficient value and significance value of 
other variables change a little bit with those in model one, this is caused by fewer 
numbers of observation. The firm size becomes insignificant with the coefficient 
value of positive 0.0031. The cash flow, networking, capital, capital expense and 
leverage ratio are still significant factors, and the coefficient sign remain the same 
with those in model 1. However, the coefficient value of cash flow increase from 
0.258 to 0.6, networking capital decrease from negative 0.27 to negative 0.57 ,capital 
expense increase from negative 0.071 to negative 0.59 and leverage ratio decrease 
from negative 0.107 to negative 0.4324. The R2 is increase from 23% to 49%.  
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Table 5 
Model  3 4 
Dependent Variable  Cash/ Asset Cash/ Asset 
Model Description ࡯ࢇ࢙ࢎ࢘ࢇ࢚࢏࢕ ൌࢻ ൅ ࢼ૚ࡿࢇ࢒ࢋ࢙ࡳ࢘࢕࢚࢝ࢎ ൅ ࢼ૛ࡿ࢏ࢠࢋ ൅ࢼ૜࡯ࡲ ൅ ࢼ૝ࡺࢃ࡯ ൅ ࢼ૞࡯࡭ࡼࡱࢄ ൅ࢼ૟ࡸࢋ࢜ࢋ࢘ࢇࢍࢋ ൅ ࢼૠࡰ࢏࢜࢏ࢊࢋ࢔ࢊ ൅ࢼૡࢎࡵ࢔ࢊࢋ࢞. 
 
࡯ࢇ࢙ࢎ࢘ࢇ࢚࢏࢕ ൌ ࢻ൅ ࢼ૚ࡿࢇ࢒ࢋ࢙ࡳ࢘࢕࢚࢝ࢎ ൅ ࢼ૛ࡿ࢏ࢠࢋ ൅ ࢼ૜࡯ࡲ൅ ࢼ૝ࡺࢃ࡯ ൅ ࢼ૞࡯࡭ࡼࡱࢄ൅ ࢼ૟ࡸࢋ࢜ࢋ࢘ࢇࢍࢋ ൅ ൅ࢼૠࢎࡵ࢔ࢊࢋ࢞Ǥ 
 
Sample 60 public firms  60 public firms 
Intercept .0398982 .0717683 
Sales Growth -.0000184 
(0.330) 
-.0000178 
(0.345) 
Firm Size .0091256 
(0.458 ) 
.0031486 
(0.759) 
Cash Flow .6111729 
(0.000)   
.6008891 
(0.000) 
Net Working Capital -.574992 
(0.000) 
-.577996 
(0.000) 
Capital Expenditure .5895649 
(0.000) 
.5907259 
(0.000) 
Leverage Ratio -.433733 
(0.000) 
-.4324741 
(0.000) 
Dividend Dummy -3.05e-08 
(0.376) 
ˉˉ 
(ˉˉ) 
H Index -1.40e-06 
(0.450) 
-1.35e-06 
(0.465) 
Adjusted R
2
 47.6% 47.65% 
 
I drop the dividend dummy in Model 4, and repeat other variables in model 3. The 
result of Model 4 also presents in the Table 5 and shows that no difference in Model 
3. 
 Change in Variables  
In this part, I am going follow the model of Bates et al(2009) to find the influence of 
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fixed unobservable company characteristics on cash holdings. The model 5 applies 
the changes in the explanatory variables of Model 1 instead of their levels. The 
model also includes the lagged change in cash and the lagged level of cash to be 
explanatory variables in order to make partial adjustment of the cash ratio to its 
equilibrium level.  
 
.The result shows that the coefficient of change in sales growth rate, networking 
capital, capital expenditure level, leverage ratio and cash ratio lag are all significant at 
5% level, however the coefficient values are quite low. The coefficient value of sales 
growth ratio is below positive 0.000 with p value of 0.000. The change in firm size has 
a negative coefficient with cash ratio however has a p value of 0.843. The change in 
cash flow has a positive relationship with cash ratio but with an insignificant p value 
of 0.546. There is a positive relationship between the cash ratio and change in 
networking capital, and the p value of 0.000 indicates the coefficient is significant. 
The leverage ratio and cash ratio lag both have a significant positive relationship with 
cash ratio, the coefficient value are 0.055 and 0.048 respectively. Lastly, the 
coefficient of change in dividend has a positive value which is smaller than 0.0001 
and with an insignificant p value of 0.483. The R2 of this model is quite low with the 
value decreasing below 8%. 
Table 6 
Model                        5  
Dependent Variable  Cash/ Asset  
Model Description  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ൌ  ? ൅  ?ଵ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?൅  ?ଶ ? ? ? ? ? ൅  ?ଷ ? ? ?൅ ?ସ ? ? ? ?൅  ?ହ ? ? ? ? ? ?൅  ?଺ ? ? ? 切? ? ? ? ?൅  ?଻ ? ? ? 切? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
 
Sample All public firms   
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Intercept .0398982  
Sales Growth .0000108  
(0.000) 
 
Firm Size  0.825 
(0.000) 
 
Cash Flow .0068601 
(0.530) 
 
Net Working Capital .1702797 
 (0.000) 
 
Capital Expenditure .1065588   
(0.012) 
 
Leverage Ratio .0558033  
(0.000) 
 
Dividend Dummy 5.50e-09   
(0.440) 
 
Adjusted R
2
 8%  
 
Interactions 
In order to find out if intercepts result from changes in the relationship between cash 
holdings and company characteristics, I am going to use three models to investigate 
the changes in both intercept and slope coefficients which followed the models 
Daher(2010) used .  
 
In this model, I will let independent variables interact with the year indicator which 
has been added in model 2. The dividend dummy is also interacted with all 
independent variables however, which find collinearity therefore I drop the dividend 
interaction. It can be seen that the result does not change much with those obtained 
in model 1. The R2 slightly increase from 23.08% to 23.82%. The signs and 
significance of the coefficients on other independent variables are in line with model 
1 except the dependent variable capital expenditure. The coefficient of capital 
expenditure changes from negative 0.07635 to positive 0.01390. 
 
The interactions of the sales growth rate and year dummy, firm size and year dummy, 
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leverage ratio and year dummy are insignificant. The interactions of cash flow and 
capital expenditure are significant at 5% level. 
 
The coefficient value of cash flow and year dummy interaction is positive 0.2182 
which indicates that an increase in coefficient with time due to the same sign of the 
coefficient on the variable and the coefficient on the interaction with the year 
dummy. In contrast, the coefficient value of capital expenditure and year dummy 
interaction is negative 0.25122 which suggests that an decrease in coefficient with 
time as the different sign of the coefficient on the variable and the coefficient on the 
interaction with the year dummy. In another word, the coefficient is lower in the 
years before 2005 than those in the years after 2005.  
Table 7 
Model  6 7    8 
Dependent 
Variable  
Cash/ Asset Cash/Asset             Cash/Asset 
Model 
Description 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ൌ  ? ൅  ?ଵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?൅  ?௡ሺሻ൅  ?௡ሺሻ 
 
 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ൌ  ? ൅  ?௡ሺሻ൅  ?௡ሺሻ
 
  
 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ൌ  ? ൅  ?ଵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ൅ ?௡ሺሻ ൅ ?௡ሺሻmmy 
Sample All public firms All public firms   All public firms 
Intercept .1254077   
(0.000) 
.1219512 
(0.000) 
.1237448   
(0.000) 
Sales Growth -.0000222 
(0.039) 
-.000022 
(0.041) 
-5.77e-06 
(0.238 ) 
Firm Size -.0158058 
(0.000) 
-.0151647 
(0.000) 
-.0155832 
(0.000) 
Cash Flow .2101335 
(0.000) 
.2107353  
(0.000)  
.2102608   
(0.000) 
Net Working 
Capital 
-.2750628 
(0.000) 
-.2750855 
(0.000) 
-.2750155 
(0.000) 
Capital 
Expenditure 
.0139044 
(0.000) 
.0146281   
(0.658) 
ˉˉ 
(ˉˉ) 
Leverage Ratio -.1154322 -.1156881    -.1095478 
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(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NewYear 
Dummy 
-.0099824 
(0.581) 
ˉˉ 
(ˉˉ) 
-.0041599   
(0.238) 
Intercept Sale 
And 
Year 
.0000208 
(0.085) 
.0000206 
(0.088) 
ˉˉ 
(ˉˉ) 
Intercept Size 
and Year  
.0005291 
(0.866) 
-.0011516 
(0.127) 
ˉˉ 
(ˉˉ) 
Intercept 
Cashflow and 
Year  
.2182797 
(0.000) 
.2155678 
(0.000) 
.2184409   
(0.000) 
Intercept 
Capital 
Expenditure and 
Year 
-.2512282 
(0.000) 
-.2528731 
(0.000) 
-.2319314 
(0.000) 
Intercept 
Leverage and 
Year 
 
.0173279 
(0.282) 
.0178179 
(0.268) 
ˉˉ 
(ˉˉ) 
DividendDumm
y and Year 
 .0560007 
(0.047) 
.0555931 
(0.048) 
.0553528   
(0.000) 
Adjusted R
2
 23.68% 23.68% 23.67% 
 
Intercept Dummies Omitted 
The only difference between Model 7 and Model 6 is that Model 7 omitting the year 
dummy. The coefficient get with this model are almost the same with the result from 
Model 6. The only change is the coefficient sign of firm size and year dummy 
interaction. In the model 6, the firm size and year dummy has a positive relationship 
with cash ratio, however it is change to a negative relationship in this model. The p 
value of firm size and year dummy in model 7 suggest a insignificant which is the 
same with model 6. 
 
Daher(2010) regress the last model by omitting variables and interactions which 
insignificant at the 5% level. And he notice that a general improvement in the 
48 
The Cash Holdings of UK Public firms 
significances of the coefficients. For example, he finds the significant level of private 
dummy increase from 10% to 5% compare to the model including those insignificant 
variables and interactions. Therefore, I regress same model by exclude the variables 
which are insignificant at level 5% in model 6. I exclude the sales growth rate, capital 
expenditure, firm size and year dummy interaction, leverage ratio and year dummy 
interaction. I get the similar result; the significant of year dummy increase, as well as 
the dividend dummy and the significance of other variables remain the same. 
 
Robustness Tests 
Lastly, I am going to test the robustness of the regression models carried out in the 
previous parts, and I am going to change the dependent variable to the log-of- cash 
and cash equivalent to total assets instead of the cash and cash equivalent to total 
assets. 
 
The table below shows the result of regression that applied log (cash ratio) rather 
than cash ratio. It can be seen that the results are very comparable in sign and 
significance to Model 1, suggesting that the changed by the difference in the 
definition of the dependent variable(Daher,2010). 
 
In contrast with the model 1, the capital expenditure becomes insignificant, and still 
remain the negative relationship with cash ratio. The dividend dummy still remains 
insignificant. The rest of the variables keep their signs and significances from Model 1. 
It can be also find that the R2 of this model is much lower than that of model 1. It 
decreases from 23.08% to 10.44%. 
 
The robust tests of Model 2 shows that the coefficient on the year dummy is positive 
and significance, it is not in line with Model 2 which indicates that year dummy is 
positive and insignificant. The R2 of this model decreases as well, from 23.08% to 
49 
The Cash Holdings of UK Public firms 
10.51%. This suggest that model 1 and 2 are capable of explaining cash ratio changes 
better than these two models. 
 
I also test the Models 3.4.5.6. The robust test of Model 3 shows that the H index 
remains its coefficient sign and insignificance from Model 3. The significance of year 
dummy also increase in this model compare with Model 3. In Model 3, the year 
dummy is highly insignificant however which is low insignificant in this model. The R2 
increased from 35.46% to 49.64%. 
The test of Model 5 is not significant itself with is the same with result obtained by 
Daher(2010). The robust test of Model 6 reveals that the significance of year dummy 
increases a lot, from highly insignificant in Model 6 to significant at level 5%. The 
coefficient and significance of other variables almost remain the same. The intercept 
changes sign and the R2 decreases again in this model. 
 
Table 8 
Model  3 4 
Dependent Variable  Log(Cash/ Asset) Log(Cash/ Asset) 
Model Description ࢒࢕ࢍሺ࡯ࢇ࢙ࢎ࢘ࢇ࢚࢏࢕ሻ ൌࢻ ൅ ࢼ૚ࡿࢇ࢒ࢋ࢙ࡳ࢘࢕࢚࢝ࢎ ൅ ࢼ૛ࡿ࢏ࢠࢋ ൅ࢼ૜࡯ࡲ ൅ ࢼ૝ࡺࢃ࡯ ൅ ࢼ૞࡯࡭ࡼࡱࢄ ൅ࢼ૟ࡸࢋ࢜ࢋ࢘ࢇࢍࢋ ൅ ࢼૠࡰ࢏࢜࢏ࢊࢋ࢔ࢊ. 
 
࢒࢕ࢍሺ࡯ࢇ࢙ࢎ࢘ࢇ࢚࢏࢕ሻ ൌ ࢻ ൅ ࢼ૚ࡿࢇ࢒ࢋ࢙ࡳ࢘࢕࢚࢝ࢎ ൅ ࢼ૛ࡿ࢏ࢠࢋ൅ ࢼ૜࡯ࡲ ൅ ࢼ૝ࡺࢃ࡯ ൅ ࢼ૞࡯࡭ࡼࡱࢄ൅ ࢼ૟ࡸࢋ࢜ࢋ࢘ࢇࢍࢋ൅Ǥ ࢼૠࡰ࢏࢜࢏ࢊࢋ࢔ࢊ൅ ࢼૡ࢟ࢋࢇ࢘ࢊ࢛࢓࢓࢟ 
 
Sample All public firms All public firms 
Intercept .0398982 .0717683 
Sales Growth -.0000929 
 (0.190 ) 
-.0000937  
 (0.186 ) 
Firm Size .1490741 
(0.000) 
 .158687 
 (0.000) 
Cash Flow 2.777067   
 (0.000)   
2.786395   
(0.000) 
Net Working Capital -2.213081  
 (0.000) 
-2.226202   
 (0.000) 
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Capital Expenditure -.4185795   
 (0.000) 
-.5253878   
(0.132) 
Leverage Ratio  -.9659267   
(0.000) 
-.9526487  
 (0.000) 
Dividend Dummy .3373171   
 (0.420) 
.3186547  
 (0.446) 
New Year Dummy (ˉˉ) 
(ˉˉ) 
.0880179 
(0.021) 
Adjusted R
2
 10.44% 10.40% 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper I investigate a large sample of UK public companies during the period 
from 1990 to 2010. Through summarize the data, I find an increase of the cash ratio 
in UK companies during the last two decades. The increase is more notable in 
companies pay no dividend than those companies pay dividend. At the same time, 
the leverage ratio increase from 1990 to 2000 and decrease from 2000 to 2010. The 
movement of net debt has a similar trend with leverage ratio, which is not consistent 
with Bates et al(2009) find in U.S. companies. This is because the leverage ratio in UK 
firms changed more than it changed in U.S. and the cash ratio changed relatively 
small in UK, therefore the trend of net debt mainly depends on the change of 
leverage ratio.  
  
I focus on the relationship between cash holdings and company characteristics and 
find a negative relationship between cash ratio and firm size, net working capital, 
capital expenditures and leverage. The sales growth rate is found not relevant with 
cash ratio and cash flow and dividend dummy are positively related to cash ratio. For 
investigate the influence of agency problem to cash ratio, I also include an indicator 
of a ownership concentration and find that the higher the ownership concentration 
in a firm, resulting in less agency problems, the less the cash that firm hold. 
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The findings for UK companies in this paper are almost consistent with general 
findings in the literature for U.S. companies. There are some differences between 
corporate governance in U.S and UK. It has been found that the ownership of listed 
shares by financial institutions (including insurance companies, pension funds and 
unit and investment trusts) in the U.K. is very high. However, although the high 
proportion ownership of financial institutions, investors are not major players from a 
principal-agent perspective. This is because the ownership in institution investors 
highly dispersed; some investment and pension funds adopt passive index strategies; 
the low institutional involvement is also affected by insider-trading regulations. 
 
The results only get a low R2 which indicate that there should be more variables to 
explain the increase in cash holdings. Moreover, due to some missing values and 
difficult to get data for some independent variables, the accuracy of result is 
influenced. Therefore, a more complete dataset with full observations could lead to 
sounder and stronger results. 
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